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Executive compensation has skyrocketed over the last 
thirty years, largely due to an increased use of equity pay. 
Corporations were able to generously compensate their top 
executives, and, at least in the short term, link executive pay 
to firm performance. Thanks to modifications to the tax code 
and accounting rules in 1993, public companies favored the 
grant of options over stock. Yet this produced perverse 
incentives, including excessive risk-taking and a heightened 
focus on short-term stock performance, which many 
commentators and policy-makers believed culminated in the 
2008 financial crisis. In response, public resentment swelled, 
spurring academic debates, congressional hearings, and 
statutory changes.  
This trend shifted in the past decade as companies now 
impel conservative behavior through executive compensation. 
This Note presents the first comprehensive study of the 
change in the equity composition of executive compensation 
after the financial crisis. For the first time, stock grants 
overtook options as the dominant form of equity pay. The 
evidence shows that the movement away from stock options is 
largely a response to the panoply of federal efforts to control 
‘excessive’ executive compensation and mitigate risk. This 
finding has important implications for regulators and 
shareholders alike who wish to offset managerial influence 
over executive pay at public companies.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
For more than two decades, the pages of finance 
journals,1 legislative hearings,2 and academic dialogue3 have 
been filled with discussions of executive compensation in the 
United States’ largest public companies.4 This is in large 
part due to the increased use of equity compensation after 
1993, generally in the form of stock and stock-option grants.5 
Equity pay is often emphasized as the key to improving 
executive accountability by linking pay to performance. After 
the profusion of accounting scandals in the early 2000s, 
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) in order to 
overhaul the requirements for all public company boards, 
management, and public accounting firms.6 The uproar 
 
1 See, e.g., New Concerns Arise on Executive Compensation, FINANCIAL 
TIMES (May 27, 2006), http://find.galegroup.com.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu 
/ftha/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=FTHA&userGroupName=columb
iau&tabID=T003&docPage=article&docId=HS2306375603&type=multipag
e&contentSet=LTO&version=1.0 (available by subscription at 
http://find.galegroup.com/ftha/index.jsp). 
2 See, e.g., Executive Compensation How Much is Too Much: Hearing 
before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 111th Cong. 1 
(2009). 
3 See, e.g., Richard Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and, if So, 
What if Anything Should Be Done About It?, 58 DUKE L. J. 1013 (2009); 
Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How 
Much You Pay, But How, HARV. BUS. REV., May–June 1990, at 138; Susan 
Lorde Martin, Executive Compensation: Reining in Runaway Abuses—
Again, 41 U.S.F.L. REV. 147 (2006). 
4 A pervasive topic in the current academic debate over corporate 
governance is the question of whether U.S. executives are overpaid. The 
increase in average total CEO compensation between 1993–2000 climbed 
from $3.7 million to $17.4 million. See Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, 
The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXF. REV. ECON. POL’Y 283, 285 (2005). 
5 In 1993, Congress eliminated the corporate income tax deduction for 
executive salaries over $1 million, since the limitation was applicable only 
to non-incentive-based compensation. See Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta 
Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing to 
the Long-term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 361 (2009). 
6 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 18). The Act introduced new measures 
demanding more stringent disclosure rules, including an increased 
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increased following the 2008 financial crisis, as the standard 
executive pay arrangements appeared to both reward 
executives for increases in short-term stock performance at 
the cost of long-term value and produce incentives for 
excessive risks.7 In response, Congress increased disclosure 
requirements for key financial services players and 
regulators through the Dodd-Frank Act.8 
Today, perceptions of the response to the financial crisis 
vary. The goal of corporate governance reform, however, is 
undisputed: to better align executive interests with those of 
shareholders.9 Many academics,10 economists,11 and policy-
 
disclosure of off-balance-sheet transactions (§401(j)), mandatory 
managerial certification of periodic reports (§302), clawback provisions for 
incentive-based compensation (§304), strengthened independence of the 
audit committee (§301), and enhanced requirements regarding auditor 
oversight and independence (§101).  
7 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-
Term Performance, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1915, 1916-1918 (2010); John C. 
Bogle, The Executive Compensation System is Broken, 30 J. CORP. L. 761, 
764 (2005) (“Too often . . . our focus is only on the short-term, and 
governance is a long-term issue”).  
8 See infra Section II.  
9 The board of directors is obligated to act in the interests of 
shareholders. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 141(a) (1983). However, an agency 
problem exists because the interests of shareholders and directors 
frequently diverge. In public companies that lack a controlling 
shareholder, the problem is especially severe since directors of these 
companies often only own a small fraction of the firm’s equity. See Lucian 
Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design 
of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 761 (2002); Robert J. 
Jackson, Jr., Private Equity and Executive Compensation, 60 UCLA L. 
REV. 638, 641 (2013). Meanwhile, company executives have substantial 
power over whether the directors remain on the board. Simultaneously, 
most shareholders own too small an interest in the firm to make 
monitoring the decisions of directors worthwhile. Id. Thus, there is thus an 
agency problem inherent in the structure of corporations since directors 
have incentives to favor executive interests over shareholder interests. 
10 See, e.g., Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 7; Bebchuk & Grinstein, 
supra note 4. 
11 See John E. Core & Wayne R. Guay, Is U.S. CEO Compensation 
Broken?, 17 J. APP. CORP. FIN. 96, 97 (2005) (discussing incentives to 
increase corporate efficiency and value, CEOs “have[e] greater incentives 
[to increase corporate efficiency and value] when his or her wealth is more 
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makers12 agree that executive compensation packages should 
include an equity component that links pay to firm 
performance. Yet options and stock grants function very 
differently in terms of incentives and risk.13 For a variety of 
reasons, options are associated with heavier risk-taking, 
which some in Washington and academia believe led to the 
recent financial crisis.14 In response, companies impel more 
conservative behavior through executive pay, including an 
increased vesting period for equity pay and a greater use of 
restricted stock compared to options.15 
This Note presents the first comprehensive study of the 
transformation of senior executive pay in public companies 
in the years after the financial crisis.16 The data presented 
here suggest that both executives and boards of public 
 
sensitive to changes in a given performance measure, such as the 
company’s stock returns.”). 
12 TARP and Executive Compensation Restrictions: Hearing Before the 
Congressional Oversight Panel, 111th Cong. 32 (2010), 
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/historical/fct/cop_hearing_20101021.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WL9L-A9MT] (statement of Kenneth R. Feinberg, 
Special Master for TARP Executive Compensation, June 2009 through 
September 2010) (It is “[v]ery important that compensation be spread and 
not be guaranteed and be tied to the overall performance of the company 
where the official works.”). 
13 See infra Section III. 
14 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 7, at 851; David I. Walker, The 
Challenge of Improving the Long-Term Focus of Executive Pay, 51 B.C. L. 
REV. 435, at 438, 440, 443 (2010); Erica Beecher-Monas, The Risks of 
Reward: The Role of Executive Compensation in Financial Crisis, 6 VA. L. 
& BUS. REV. 101, 111 (2011); Sharon Hannes & Avraham Tabbach, 
Executive Stock Options: The Effects of Manipulation on Risk Taking, 38 J. 
CORP. L. 533, 544–45 (2013); Press Release, Cong. Oversight Panel, 
Congressional Oversight Panel Examines Executive Compensation 
Restrictions in the Troubled Asset Relief Program (Feb. 10, 2011), 
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/historical/fct/cop/cop_pressrelease_201102
10.pdf [https://perma.cc/NY7T-ECDZ].  
15 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 3, at 1045–46; Bhagat & Romano, 
supra note 5, at 359; Bebchuk et al., supra note 9, at 828. 
16 I define “senior executives” as the chief executive officer (“CEO”), 
chief financial officer (“CFO”), and the three most highly compensated 
employees other than the CEO and CFO, in line with the current SEC rule 
for reporting. See infra note 80. 
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companies are moving away from compensation based 
largely on stock-option grants in favor of compensation based 
on stocks. The evidence also demonstrates that equity pay as 
a percentage of executive compensation packages has been 
increasing since 2010. This suggests a more conservative 
approach to executive compensation packages than there had 
been before the crisis. 
These findings have important implications for the 
relationship between equity compensation and corporate 
risk-taking. They also offer lessons to the regulators now 
charged with writing new rules of public company executive 
pay. This Note proceeds as follows. Section I summarizes the 
rise in the use of option-based compensation and discusses 
Congressional and regulatory pay policies over the last two 
decades. Section II presents data on the composition of 
executive equity pay packages in public companies from 2006 
to 2014. Section III discusses the implications of this study’s 
findings for the current debate over corporate governance 
policies surrounding executive pay at public companies. 
II. FEDERAL RESPONSES TO THE USE OF 
OPTIONS IN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
In 1992, average CEO compensation was $2.3 million.17 
Just over ten years later, in 2005, average CEO 
compensation had more than doubled to $5.5 million.18 The 
rapid rise in CEO compensation correlates neatly with the 
growing use of stock options as a percentage of that 
compensation.19 The numbers for executives at Standard & 
Poor (“S&P”) 500 companies soared at an even more 
staggering rate.20 This Section will focus on several broad-
reaching reforms in the past two decades that Congress and 
 
17 Posner, supra note 3, at 1021. 
18 Id. at 1022. 
19 Bebchuk et al., supra note 9. 
20 See, e.g., William W. Bratton, The Academic Tournament over 
Executive Compensation, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1557, 1562 (2005) (showing that 
senior executive compensation grew to $9.4 million by 2002). 
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regulatory agencies levied in their attempts to curb corporate 
leadership abuses. 
A. Change in Accounting Rules 
Options used to be an advantageous form of compensation 
for firms for accounting reasons: unlike a salary, these 
awards were not treated as an expense on the company’s 
books.21 Consequently, option grants had no effect on 
earnings, no matter how much the executive received from 
exercising the options. This is significant because earnings 
drive stock prices. In 2004, however, the Financial 
Accounting Services Board (“FASB”) eliminated this 
accounting advantage by requiring that all options be 
recorded as an expense.22 Two years later, the Securities 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) decided that the accounting 
rules for the taxation of stock-based compensation would be 
governed by the Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 123(R), Share-Based Payment (“FAS 
123(R)”).23 
This decision was issued in response to concerns that 
methods under the prior rules (APB 25) did not result in an 
accurate representation of the “economic transaction” of 
granting stock options.24 Under APB 25, no compensation 
cost must be recorded in financial statements for stock 
options issued to employees if the exercise price is equal to or 
greater than the market price on the date of the grant.25 FAS 
 
21 Jerry W. Markham, Regulating Excessive Executive 
Compensation—Why Bother?, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 277, 294 (2007). 
22 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCZ-39-06, PRESENT LAW AND 
BACKGROUND RELATING TO EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 38–39 (2006), 
http://www.jct.gov/x-39-06.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TUA-CXQL] [hereinafter 
Finance Committee Hearing].  
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 38. Additionally, there were concerns that stock-based 
compensation should be accounted for using one method (rather than 
allowing companies to use either APB 25 or FAS 123(R)), and that the 
rules under FAS 123(R) are more consistent with those under the 
International Financial Reporting Standards. Id. 
25 Id. at 43. 
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123(R), in contrast, requires companies to measure 
compensation costs based on the award’s fair value as of the 
grant date.26 Accounting for stock options under FAS 123(R) 
thus results in a greater compensation expense than under 
APB 25. Because the mandatory stock option expensing 
caused options to be comparatively more expensive, FAS 
123(R) may have led companies to rely less heavily on stock 
options in the design of their executive compensation 
packages. 
B. SEC Public Disclosure Rules 
The SEC has sought to better enforce accountability in 
executive compensation through disclosure reforms; 
providing shareholders and other observers with more 
comprehensive information will enable them to make 
informed decisions.27 These reforms have followed a twisted 
path. In 1992, the SEC adopted rules that moved away from 
disclosures in narrative form and back to using tables that 
permitted comparability from year to year.28 Yet the strength 
of the tables’ clarity and comparability was also their 
weakness: they were “highly formatted and rigid,” 
preventing information that was not specifically mandated 
from being included in the tables.29 On July 26, 2006, the 
SEC amended the disclosure rules for executive 
compensation to provide for enhanced Summary 
 
26 Id. at 38–39. To estimate the value of the options, the company 
must use option-pricing models that take into account the exercise price of 
the option, the expected option term, the current price of the underlying 
shares, the expected volatility of the price, the expected dividends, and the 
risk-free interest rates. The Joint Committee on Taxation suggests the 
binomial option-pricing model or the Black-Scholes-Merton option-pricing 
formula. Id. 
27 LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, 192–94 (Harv. Univ. 
Press ed., 2004). 
28 Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. 
Reg. 53,158, 53,160 (Sept. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 
229, 232, 239, 240, 245, 249, 274).  
29 Id. at 53,161. 
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Compensation and Director Compensation tables, along with 
a narrative overview consisting of a general discussion and 
analysis of the compensation.30 The SEC’s stated purpose 
was to provide investors with a “more complete and useful 
disclosure” regarding executive compensation.31 
Furthermore, the SEC announced that it would align the 
reporting of equity awards with the FAS 123(R) 
requirements.32 In furtherance of this objective, the SEC 
made the following revisions. First, the SEC revised the 
dollar values in the “Stock Awards” and “Options Awards” 
columns of the Summary Compensation and Director 
Compensation tables to disclose the compensation cost of the 
awards, before reflecting forfeitures, as described in FAS 
123(R).33 Second, the SEC revised the tabular presentation of 
option grants to require disclosure of the grant date fair 
value, the FAS 123(R) grant date, the closing market price 
on the grant date if greater than the exercise price, and the 
date the compensation committee took action to grant the 
award if different from the grant date.34 Third, the SEC 
revised the calculation for the value of both stock and options 
grants to be determined by the grant date fair value, rather 
 
30 Id. at 53,162. The narrative overview provides information about 
the company’s compensation objectives, policies, procedures, and 
processes. It must include the objectives of the compensation program, 
what the compensation program is designed to reward, each element of the 
compensation, why the company chooses to pay for each element, how the 
company determines the amount for each element, and how each element 
fits into the company’s overall compensation objectives. These disclosure 
rules apply to the CEO, CFO, and three other highest paid executives 
other than the CEO and CFO. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Amends 
Executive Compensation Disclosure to More Closely Align with FAS 123R 
(Dec. 22, 2006), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-219.htm 
[https://perma.cc/9LVD-L3CB]. 
31 Executive Compensation Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 78,338, 78,338 
(Dec. 29, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229).  
32 Id.  
33 Id. The forfeitures must be described in a footnote. Id.  
34 Press Release, SEC, SEC Votes to Adopt Changes to Disclosure 
Requirements Concerning Executive Compensation and Related Matters 
(Jul. 26, 2006), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-123.htm 
[https://perma.cc/WDY7-ZK3C]. 
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than the number of securities.35 Fourth, the SEC revised the 
Grants of Plan-Based Awards Table to require disclosure of 
the grant date fair value of each individual equity award.36 
Finally, the SEC made revisions requiring the company to 
discuss in the narrative disclosure the timing of the grant 
date of the stocks regarding the release of material 
information.37 As with the changes in accounting rules, the 
revised disclosure rules have made options an increasingly 
expensive choice for companies. 
C. Amendments to the Tax Code 
Congress has long used the federal tax code to limit the 
amount and type of executive compensation. Proponents of 
enhanced executive accountability argue that tax-based 
initiatives are a good way to make compensation structures 
more performance based.38 This is not surprising given the 
tax implications for executives and corporations regarding 
these payments. Critics, however, argue not only that such 
tax provisions are ineffective at reducing executive 
 
35 Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. 
Reg. at 53,171–72. The only change is that the awards are disclosed in 
dollars, rather than the number of units or shares, but this provides 
shareholders with a more accurate and current estimation of the value of 
the compensation package when granted to the highest paid executive 
officers. Id. at 53,172.  
36 Id. at 53,179. This is important because it required disclosure of 
any stock or option appreciation right that was repriced or materially 
modified during the last completed fiscal year, including the incremental 
fair value that was computed as of the repricing or modification date. The 
objective is to give shareholders a clear and current picture of the 
executive compensation package. Executive Compensation Disclosure, 71 
Fed. Reg. at 78,338.  
37 Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. 
Reg. at 53,163. Examples include a grant date immediately prior to the 
release of significant positive earnings or a new product development. Id. 
While the SEC does not comment on whether it is good or bad practice to 
time grant dates, its disclosure requirement appears to be in line with an 
attempt to prevent options backdating.  
38 Kathryn J. Kennedy, Excessive Executive Compensation: Prior 
Federal Attempts to Curb Perceived Abuses, 10 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 196, 
199 (2010). 
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compensation levels, but also that they impose a variety of 
unexpected costs.39 Two sections in the code that target 
executive compensation are discussed below: Section 409A 
and Section 162(m).40 
1. Section 409A 
On October 22, 2004, President George W. Bush signed 
the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, creating Section 
409A of the Internal Revenue Code.41 This section 
implemented sweeping changes to the tax law applicable to 
nonqualified deferred compensation (“NQDC”) plans, which 
often consist of non-qualified stock options (“NQSO”).42 
Employers often use NQDC plans to induce certain behavior. 
For instance, a company may condition that certain 
compensation will be paid only if the executive remains with 
the company for a specified number of years. The company 
may also require the deferral of certain compensation in 
 
39 See generally Andrew C.W. Lund, Tax’s Triviality as a Pay-
Reforming Device, 57 VILL. L. REV. 571 (2012); Joy Sabino Mullane, 
Incidence and Accidents: Regulation of Executive Compensation Through 
the Tax Code, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 485 (2009); Susan J. Stabile, Is 
There a Role For Tax Law in Policing Executive Compensation?, 72 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 81 (1998); Kennedy, supra note 38. 
40 These examples are not exhaustive but an extensive analysis of the 
tax code is beyond the scope of this Note. Another example includes 
restrictions on the terms of golden parachute payments. See I.R.C. § 280G 
(2012); I.R.C. § 4999 (2012).  
41 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 885, 
118 Stat. 1418 (2004). 
42 An NQDC plan is an arrangement between an employer and one or 
more employees to defer the receipt of currently earned compensation. 
I.R.C. § 409A applies to any plan providing for a deferral of compensation 
other than a qualified employer plan. Qualified employer plans include 
tax-qualified retirement plans (I.R.C. § 401(a) qualified plans, 457(b) 
plans, 403(a) and (b) annuity plans, SEPs, SIMPLEs, and government 
excess benefit arrangements under I.R.C. § 415(m))—or a bona fide 
vacation, sickness, disability, and death benefit plan. Finance Committee 
Hearing, supra note 22, at 20. 
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order to comply with the Section 162(m) limitation on the 
deductibility of compensation in excess of $1 million.43 
Section 409A was the first rule that specifically governed 
the tax treatment of NQDC plans.44 Section 409A provides 
that amounts deferred under an NQDC plan will be 
includible in income and subject to an additional 20% excise 
tax.45 Simply put, Section 409A penalizes improper deferrals 
of compensation by imposing heavy tax consequences. The 
rule’s objective is to eliminate abuses related to election 
timing, distribution timing, and the ability to take 
accelerated payments under such plans.46 The IRS issued 
guidance under 409A in Notice 2005-1 released on December 
 
43 See infra Section II.C.2, Section IV.B.2. 
44 Finance Committee Hearing, supra note 22, at 19. Incentive stock 
options (“ISOs,” or statutory stock options) receive a more beneficial tax 
treatment than do NQSOs, but there are several requirements that the 
plan must meet to qualify as an ISO. These requirements, which are listed 
in I.R.C. § 422(b), include the following: options must be exercised within 
10 years of their grant; they must be nontransferable except by death; the 
employee must remain with the employer; at least two years must lapse 
between the grant date and the employee’s sale of the stock; and at least 
one year must lapse between the exercise date and the sale of the stock. 
Furthermore, I.R.C. § 422(d) sets a $100,000 annual limit on the aggregate 
value of the stock that any one executive can acquire by exercising ISOs. If 
any of these requirements are not met, the stock options will be taxed as 
an NQSO plan. ISOs never generate deductions for employers, and the 
employee’s income will not be taxed until sold, with the difference between 
the sale price and the exercise price taxed as a capital gain. Daniel L. 
Slaton, Solving Stock Option Compensation: Why Book Tax Conformity 
May Not Be the Answer, 9 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L. J. 175, 190 (2008). The 
difficulty in meeting the requirements of I.R.C. §§ 422(b) and (d), however, 
prevents many companies from receiving the ISO tax advantages. See, e.g., 
Gary Cvach & Terri Stecher, Incentive Stock Options—Navigating the 
Requirements for Compliance, KPMG: What’s News in Tax (May 2, 2016), 
https://home.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2016/05/tnf-wnit-iso-may-2-
2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/KR4D-GFHC]. 
45 Finance Committee Hearing, supra note 22, at 19. 
46 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 
1418 (2004). 
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20, 2004 and gave taxpayers until December 31, 2005 to 
bring their documents into compliance.47 
An important feature of Section 409A is its impact on 
equity awards.48 Prior to Section 409A’s prescript, executives 
engaged in options backdating to a grant or exercise date at 
which the underlying stock price was lower in order to 
imperil benefits, resulting in an underpayment of taxes.49 
Under Notice 2005-1, however, non-discounted stock options 
(which are granted at a price above the fair market value of 
the stock on the date of the grant) are not considered NQDC 
under Section 409A, and thus are not subject to its 
requirements.50 However, a discounted option with an 
exercise price below the fair market value of the stock at the 
date of the grant is subject to the rules under 409A.51 Thus, a 
backdated option would likely be treated as a NQDC plan 
and subject to the requirements of Section 409A, such as the 
income exclusion, the 20% excise tax, and interest at the rate 
applicable to underpayments of the tax plus one percentage 
 
47 I.R.S. Notice 2005-1, 2005-1 C.B. 274, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
drop/n-05-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/8B8T-M9B8].  
48 The conference report for I.R.C. § 409A does not mention restricted 
stock, but the Treasury regulations separately exclude restricted property 
from the reach of § 409A, stating that “there is no deferral of compensation 
merely because the value of the property [received] is not includible in 
income by reason of the property being substantially nonvested.” Treas. 
Reg. § 1.409A-1(b)(6)(i) (2008). 
49 The backdating of option exercises has similar implications: here, 
the company is misrepresenting the date at which the option is exercised 
to make it appear that the exercise occurred at an earlier date—and lower 
price—than when the exercise actually occurred. Thus, executives can 
backdate the exercise date to correspond with the low point of the closing 
price of the company’s stock, thereby minimizing the gain reported as 
ordinary income. Furthermore, because any additional gain to the 
executive is treated as a capital gain when the stock is held for a year 
prior to sale, the executive can maximize the capital gain treatment of any 
eventual profit by starting the clock early on the holding period. 
Christopher Cox, Testimony Concerning Options Backdating, SEC (Sept. 6, 
2006), https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2006/ts090606cc.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5RD3-2S7T]. 
50 I.R.S. Notice 2005-1, supra note 47. 
51 Finance Committee Hearing, supra note 22, at 32. 
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point.52 Consequently, the tax treatment for option 
compensation under Section 409A may make stock option 
backdating less advantageous, therefore further eliminating 
the preference for options. 
2. Section 162(m) 
Proponents of using the tax code to better link pay with 
performance in executive compensation have also 
concentrated on tax benefits, such as the deductibility of 
wages.53 Normally, executive salaries, like employee wages, 
are deductible business expenses.54 Section 162(m), however, 
limits the tax deductibility of compensation to $1 million, 
whether paid in cash or otherwise.55 Simultaneously, 
companies are permitted to deduct the cost of executive 
salaries only so long as such salaries qualify as 
“performance-based compensation.”56 The objective is to 
ensure that companies reform their executive compensation 
schemes to better link pay with performance, shifting from 
fixed compensation plans (which are not deductible) to 
performance-based plans (which are). 
To qualify for the “performance-based” exception to the $1 
million limitation, the compensation must be paid solely on 
account of the executive’s attainment of performance goals as 
determined by an objective formula.57 A compensation 
 
52 Id. at 41. 
53 See I.R.C. § 162(a) (2012) (“There shall be allowed as a deduction 
all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid . . .  in carrying on any trade 
or business, including (1) a reasonable allowance for salaries”).  
54 Finance Committee Hearing, supra note 22, at 3. 
55 I.R.C. § 162(m)(1) (2012) (“In the case of any publicly held 
corporation, no deduction shall be allowed . . .  with respect to any covered 
employee to the extent that the amount of such remuneration for the 
taxable year with respect to such employee exceeds $1,000,000.”). 
56 See I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C) (2012) (the limits on deductibility “shall 
not include any remuneration payable solely on account of the attainment 
of one or more performance goals”). 
57 See I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C)(i)-(iii). This can include stock price, 
market share, sales, costs, and earnings, and it can be applied at the level 
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committee of two or more independent directors must 
establish the performance goal, and then a majority of the 
shareholders must approve it.58 Finally, before the payment 
is made to the executive, the compensation committee must 
certify that the performance goals have been met.59 
Stock options or stock appreciation rights meet the 
exception, no matter how large, since the amount of 
compensation attributed to the options is based solely on the 
increase in the stock price. This increase displays a clear 
improvement in the corporation’s performance.60 Grants of 
restricted stock, on the other hand, are not considered 
inherently performance-based because the executive will 
receive the compensation even if the stock price decreases or 
stays the same. Thus, restricted stock is treated like cash 
compensation and will not satisfy Section 162(m) unless the 
grant or vesting of the restricted stock is based on the 
attainment of performance goals. In effect, “the expected 
payoffs on restricted stock . . . are less sensitive to share 
price movements than the payoffs for . . . options.”61 As a 
result, Section 162(m) makes stock options relatively less 
expensive than base salaries, bonuses, or stock grants—all of 
which are subject to the $1 million cap.62 
 
of the individual, business unit, or corporation. Finance Committee 
Hearing, supra note 22, at 4. 
58 I.R.C. §§ 162(m)(4)(C)(i)–(ii) (2012). 
59 I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C)(iii) (2012). 
60 I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(G) (2012) (unless the exercise price is less than 
the fair market price of the stock at the time of the grant). Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi) (“Compensation attributable to a stock option or a 
stock appreciation right is deemed [fully deductible if] the amount of 
compensation the employee could receive is based solely on an increase in 
the value of the stock after the date of the grant or award.”). 
61 David I. Walker, The Non-Option: Understanding the Dearth of 
Discounted Employee Stock Options, 89 B.U.L. REV. 1505, 1535 (2009). 
62 I.R.C. § 162(m) (2012). These tax changes only applied to the most 
senior executives—the CEOs and the other four highest paid employees. 
I.R.C. § 162(m)(3) (2012). After the SEC amended its disclosure 
requirements under the Securities Exchange Act in 2006 to include 
individuals serving as the principal executive officer, the principal 
financial officer, and the three highest compensated executives other than 
the two aforementioned, the IRS issued new guidance that changes the 
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Moreover, Section 162(m) favors certain types of options: 
if the executive receives option grants with an exercise price 
equal to or greater than the market price, then the options 
are presumed to be performance-based. This is because the 
compensation ultimately received is based solely on an 
increase in the value of the stock after the date of the 
grant.63 A discounted stock option, with an exercise price 
below the market price, however, has value immediately, so 
it cannot be described as “performance-based.” Thus, at-the-
money options receive more favorable tax treatment, since 
they fall under the exception to the $1 million limitation. As 
discussed in Section I.C.1 supra, executives may backdate 
options to the lowest price of the underlying stock in order to 
 
group of covered employees subject to the compensation deduction limit 
under Section 162(m). Under the new rules, the company’s CFO will never 
be subject to Section 162(m), even if the CFO is one of the most highly 
compensated officers. I.R.S. Notice 2007-49, 2007-1 C.B. 1429, 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-07-49.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZS7E-
Q44K]. Furthermore, the total number of officers in addition to the CEO 
who are subject to Section 162(m) was reduced from four to three. Id. at 3. 
This change is intended to resolve the conflict between the 2006 amended 
SEC disclosure rules and Section 162(m). While the amended disclosure 
rules continue to require disclosure for five executive officers, two are now 
covered by the rules based on their positions, and three are covered based 
on their level of compensation. In contrast, a covered employee under 
Section 162(m) consists of one executive officer based on her position and 
four based on their level of compensation. Id. The interpretation 
specifically provides that the principal financial officer is not included as a 
covered employee, and as a result, is not subject to the Section 162(m) 
deduction limitation. Id. at 4. 
63 The conference report for I.R.C. § 162(m) describes:  
Stock-based compensation is not treated as performance-
based if it is dependent on other factors other than 
corporate performance. For example, if a stock option is 
granted to an executive with an exercise price that is less 
than the current fair market value of the stock at the time 
of the grant, then the executive would have the right to 
receive compensation on the exercise of the option even if 
the stock price decreases or stays the same. Thus, [such] 
options . . . do not meet the requirements for performance-
based compensation.  
Finance Committee Hearing, supra note 22, at 5. 
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avoid detrimental tax consequences. Yet the imposition of 
Section 162(m) provides that discounted stock options will 
not be subject to the deduction, further reducing their appeal 
to company boards. 
D. Dodd-Frank 
The economic collapse of 2008 focused the spotlight back 
on executive compensation, prompting questions about 
better ways to structure pay in order to balance firms’ long-
term interests with executives’ demands. Yet the 
government’s stimulus package only heightened the public 
fervor surrounding executive compensation. Although the 
Federal Reserve provided an $85 billion bailout to American 
International Group (AIG), the firm was still permitted to 
pay $165 million in retention bonuses to its executives.64 In 
2010, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act.65 Title IX contains seven 
sections designed to mandate various changes in corporate 
governance matters.66 The goal of the Act’s passage is to 
“promote the long-term sustainability of the U.S. financial 
system” by “protect[ing] investors, enhanc[ing] market 
stability, and promot[ing] capital formation.”67 
Although Dodd-Frank took effect on July 21, 2010, the 
SEC only recently proposed a rule with regard to Section 
 
64 Bhagat & Romano, supra note 15, at 360. Note that these were not 
merit bonuses, based on performance, but retention bonuses that enabled 
the executives to safely unwind the credit default swaps in a time-
sensitive manner.   
65 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of the U.S. Code).  
66 Id. These seven sections consist of §§ 951 (shareholder approval of 
executive compensation, or “say-on-pay”), 952 (compensation committee 
independence), 953 (executive compensation disclosures), 954 
(compensation clawbacks), 955 (employee and director hedging disclosure), 
956 (compensation structure reporting), and 957 (broker voting). 
67 Mary Jo White, Statement on the Anniversary of the Dodd-Frank 
Act, SEC (July 16, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/statement-
on-the-anniversary-of-the-dodd-frank-act.html [https://perma.cc/2Z3G-
TWXK]. 
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953(a) (“Disclosure of Pay Versus Performance”) on April 29, 
2015.68 Section 953(a) adds Section 14(i) to the Securities 
and Exchange Act and seeks to coordinate “the relationship 
between executive compensation actually paid and the 
financial performance of the issuer, taking into account any 
change in the value of the shares of stock and dividends of 
the issuer and any distributions.”69 Specifically, it calls for 
the SEC to devise rules requiring a company to provide in its 
annual proxy statement a “clear description,” which may 
include a “graphic representation,” to show the “relationship 
between executive compensation actually paid and the 
financial performance of the issuer.”70 According to a 
proposal the SEC released for comment in April 2015, 
companies will be required to disclose the relationship 
between executive pay and performance, starting with 2016 
annual schedule 14A and schedule 14C proxy and 
solicitation statements issued prior to shareholder 
meetings.71 This rule, if accepted, will require the reporting 
of bonuses and other compensation actually paid out (as 
opposed to accrued or vested) for the previous five fiscal 
years to the company’s CEO;72 it will be listed in a table 
alongside the share performance of the company and its 
peers.73 
While President Obama described Dodd-Frank as “the 
toughest financial reform since the ones we created in the 
aftermath of the Great Depression,”74 Section 953 was not 
 
68 Press Release, SEC, SEC Proposes Rules to Require Companies to 
Disclose the Relationship Between Executive Pay and a Company’s 
Financial Performance (Apr. 29, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/press 
release/2015-78.html [https://perma.cc/P44T-GHJV]. 
69 Dodd-Frank Act § 953(a)(i).  
70 Id. 
71 Press Release, SEC, supra note 68. 
72 Id. (“The amount disclosed for the remaining executive officers 
would be the average compensation actually paid to those executives.”). 
73 Pay Versus Performance, 80 Fed. Reg. 26,330, 26,332 (proposed 
May 7, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240).  
74 Obama’s Remarks on the Financial Deal, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/26/us/politics/26regulate-text.html 
[https://perma.cc/XNA6-YNU9]. 
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without its detractors. The Center on Executive 
Compensation found that the provision is “unprecedented in 
[its] vagueness and breadth” and fails to specify the measure 
of comparison for what is “actually paid.”75 The Center 
argued that this provision has the unintended consequence 
of encouraging short-term financial performance, rather 
than rewarding strategies that increase long-term 
shareholder value.76 
It is too early to analyze the effects of Section 953 on 
executive compensation suites, since its application begins 
with the 2016 annual schedules.77 One foreseeable problem 
is the difficulty in matching long-term incentive awards with 
appropriate periods of financial performance. The rule states 
that equity awards would be considered “actually paid” on 
the date of vesting—even if, in the case of stock options, they 
have yet to be exercised—and valued at their fair value on 
the vesting date, computed under FASB 123(R).78 Yet Section 
953(a), by requiring the vesting date value of a stock option 
to be reported at fair value,79 will result in more 
compensation actually paid. This is because an option’s fair 
value almost always exceeds its intrinsic value and an “out-
of-the-money” option has some fair value (but no intrinsic 
 
75 Letter from Timothy J. Bartl, Senior Vice President and General 
Counsel, Center on Executive Compensation, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, 
Secretary, SEC (Sept. 1, 2010) at 1-2, http://www.execcomp.org/Docs/c10-
41%20COEC%20Comments%20on%20Exec%20Comp%20in%20Title%20I
X%20Dodd-Frank.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RMS-KGYQ] (Comments on 
Executive Compensation and Governance Provisions in Title IX, Subtitle E 
of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act). This 
refers to the Senate-passed version of the bill, which is identical to the 
final provision in Dodd-Frank. 
76 Id. at 2. See also Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes 
on the U.K. Experience and the Case for Shareholder Opt-In, 46 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 323 (2009) (providing an in-depth analysis of the problems 
associated with a mandatory say-on-pay regime in the United Kingdom). 
77 Press Release, SEC, supra note 68. 
78 Pay Versus Performance, 80 Fed. Reg. at 26,339. 
79 This is in contrast to intrinsic value, which is the excess, if any, of 
the aggregate value of the shares underlying the option minus the 
aggregate exercise price of the option. 
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value). Thus, Dodd-Frank has the effect of reducing option-
based compensation. 
III. EVIDENCE ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF STOCK 
AND OPTIONS GRANTS IN EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION PACKAGES 
The stark rise in the use of stock option grants and 
corresponding increase in corporate scandals attracted 
attention from federal agencies to curb perceived abuses—
largely at the expense of option compensation. Indeed, the 
evidence in this Section suggests that since 2009, there has 
been an aggregate increase in stock compensation and 
decline in option compensation. This Section describes the 
design of current senior executive equity pay packages at 
over 3,300 publicly traded companies in the United States 
and the evolution of equity pay from 2006 to 2014. 
Specifically, this Section investigates (1) the evolution of the 
composition of senior executive equity compensation; (2) the 
variations in equity pay arrangements by CEO age; and (3) 
the variations in equity pay arrangements by firm size. 
In line with SEC disclosure requirements, companies 
must divulge compensation details for the five most senior 
executive officers in their proxy statements.80 By drawing on 
these filings, this Note provides the first systematic study of 
the evolution of equity pay arrangements across a broad 
spectrum of companies in the years after 2006. The 
underlying hypothesis is that following the onslaught of 
Congressional actions in the early 2000s that caused options 
to be comparatively expensive, companies responded by 
increasing the weight of stock grants in pay packages. 
 
80 Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. 
Reg. 53,158, 53,241 (Sept. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 
229, 232, 239, 240, 245, 249, 274). As discussed in Section II, the current 
SEC rule requires disclosure for the CEO, CFO, and the three most highly 
compensated employees other than the CEO and CFO. The prior rule 
(before 2007) mandated disclosure for the CEO and the four most highly 
compensated employees other than the CEO. In most firms, however, the 
same executives are covered by either rule.  
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A. Methodology 
This study used data from S&P’s Compustat database, 
obtained through Wharton Data Research Services.81 The 
analysis begins with 2006 because the data for stock grants 
and total compensation are not directly comparable in the 
periods before and after 2006. Briefly, beginning in 2006, 
Compustat accounted for the grant date fair value of stock 
and option awards, as well as the annualized expense 
associated with the award. Under the 2006 reporting format, 
the variable STOCK_AWARDS_FV included all stock awards 
(time-vested restricted stock, performance-vested restricted 
stock, and performance shares) and the variable 
OPTIONS_AWARDS_FV included all option awards 
(traditional stock options, performance-vested options, and 
stock appreciation rights (“SARs”)).82 Prior to the FAS 123(R) 
accounting requirements levied in 2006, the variable 
OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE used Black-Scholes 
methodology to generate the value of the options grants.83 
 
81 Wharton Research Data Service, WHARTON, UNIV. OF PA., 
https://wrds-web.wharton.up-enn.edu/wrds (last visited Apr. 8, 2017). 
S&P’s Compustat database includes executive compensation data 
extracted from the proxy statements of over 3,300 active and inactive 
firms in the S&P 1500 index, plus a handful of additional firms. Data are 
compiled from annual company proxy statements filed with the SEC 
within 120 days of the company fiscal year end. Compensation data for the 
top five executives are typically reported each year, giving rise to details 
on over 39,000 executives. Occasional data entry errors exist, and several 
egregious outliers were removed (for example, the listing of TDC1 (the 
marker for total compensation) for both Jan Koum of Facebook in 2014, 
and Jeffrey Katzenberg of Dreamworks in 2006, as “0.001”), yet there is no 
better way to code such an immense amount of data. Any errors that 
remain are the fault of the author. 
82 A SAR provides the recipient with the right to receive the amount 
of the increase in value of employer stock during a specified period. The 
recipient will receive the increase in value by exercising the SAR. 
Variations among SARs may include limitations on exercise until certain 
objectives are met, or the allowance of the proceeds of the SAR to be paid 
in stock rather than cash. Finance Committee Hearing, supra note 22, at 
42. 
83 The Black-Scholes formula is one of the most well known models for 
valuing option pricing. It uses five inputs: strike price, stock price, time 
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For stock, the equivalent pre-2006 variable was RSTKGRNT, 
which did not include the value of performance shares. 
Instead, performance shares were included in LTIP (long-
term incentive plans), along with long-term non-equity plan 
awards. 
The inconsistency in the calculation of options carried 
over to the total compensation variable TDC1. Before 2006, 
TDC1 included salary, bonus, other annual compensation, 
the grant date value of restricted stock (not including 
performance shares), the grant date value of options and 
SARs (based on the Black-Scholes methodology), long-term 
incentive plan payouts (including performance shares), and 
other total compensation. The 2006 version of TDC1 includes 
salary, bonus, non-equity incentive plan payouts, grant date 
value of stock (including performance shares) and options 
(including SARs), deferred compensation earnings, and other 
compensation. Consequently, as these two measures are not 
directly comparable, this Note only analyzes the composition 
of executive pay packages in the years after 2006. 
The calculation of various equity pay instruments has 
evolved over the last decade, largely due to changes in 
accounting rules and SEC disclosure rules. The fundamental 
composition of equity pay, however, has not changed.84 Thus, 
in the analysis that follows, “stock” includes time-vested 
restricted stock,85 performance-vested restricted stock,86 and 
 
until expiration, volatility, and risk free interest rate. Proxy Statements 
Not Required to Value Option Grants to Outside Directors, 9 RIA PENSION 
& BENEFITS WEEK NEWSLETTER 22 (2003).  
84 For example, calculating by the grant date, rather than the exercise 
date. See supra Part I.  
85 Time-vested restricted stock is the conventional stock compensation 
plan: compensation in the form of company stock. The executive does not 
secure the stock immediately, but receives it according to a vesting plan 
and distribution schedule if she remains with the employer for a 
designated length of time. The most common period of vesting is three 
years. See generally The 2015 Top 250: Long-Term Incentive Grant 
Practices for Executives, FREDERICK W. COOK & CO., INC. 4 (2015), 
http://www.fwcook.com/content/Documents/Publications/FWC_2015_Top_2
50.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YST-4AVM]. Restricted stock may be granted in 
two forms. The first is an award, in which the executive owns the shares 
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performance shares (also known as phantom stock units).87 
The category of “options” refers to conventional employee 
stock options (including both nonqualified stock and 
incentive stock options),88 performance-vested stock 
 
outright, but may not take full ownership rights until after the vesting 
requirements are met. Second, she may receive stock in the form of a unit, 
in which the actual stock is not issued until the vesting requirements are 
satisfied. If the shares fail to vest, the award is forfeited. Carol Meyers 
Edelstein, Long-Term Incentives for Management, Part 4: Restricted Stock, 
13 COMPENSATION & BENEFITS REV. 30 (1981).   
86 Performance-vested restricted stock mandates that in addition to 
the retention requirements, the executive must achieve certain stated 
performance milestones. Like time-vested restricted stock, performance-
vested restricted stock may also come in the form of awards or units. See 
David I. Walker, Evolving Executive Equity Compensation and the Limits 
of Optimal Contracting, 64 VAND. L. REV. 611, 631–32 n.65 (2011).  
87 A performance share, or “phantom stock unit,” is a restricted stock 
share (or unit) that vests upon the achievement of company-specified 
performance conditions. After the share vests, the executive will receive 
payment in either cash or shares of common stock (at a one-to-one ratio 
with each phantom stock unit), plus any dividends that accrued from the 
grant date until the vesting period. The difference between performance 
shares and performance-vested restricted stock is insignificant, 
economically-speaking. Id. at 631–32 n.66. 
88 A stock option is the right, but not the obligation, to purchase a 
company’s stock at a fixed price for a fixed period of time. The primary 
difference between the two types of stock options—non-qualified stock 
options and incentive stock options—lies in their tax treatment. See supra 
Section II.C.1. Recall that ISOs are only available to employees and 
limited to $100,000. Id. at n.43. No income is reported when the option is 
exercised and the entire gain from the sale of the stock is taxed as long-
term capital gains. Nonqualified stock options (“NSOs”) are options 
granted in unlimited amounts that do not receive the same tax-favored 
treatment as ISOs. After exercise, the difference between the fair market 
value on the exercise date and the grant date price is reported as ordinary 
income. Gains (or losses) from the sale of the stock after exercise will be 
recorded as a capital gain (or loss). Because there is no limit on the 
amount of options that can be offered, NSOs will more likely compensate 
senior executives. Additionally, employers generally prefer NSOs because 
they may take a tax deduction stemming from what the recipient includes 
in her income. When “options” are discussed, NSOs tend to be the options 
under discussion. James M. Bickley, Employee Stock Options: Tax 
Treatment and Tax Issues, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 3 (2012), 
ADES-LAURENT – FINAL   
370 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2017 
options,89 and SARs.90 The vast majority of options issued are 
conventional options, in turn dominated by nonqualified 
stock options (“NSOs”).91 Additionally, “[a]lmost all 
compensatory options issued by U.S. firms have been ‘at-the-
money’ options,” meaning that the strike price is set equal to 
the fair market value of the company’s stock at the date of 
the option grant.92 Discounted, or “in-the-money” options, 
have rarely been observed and have dwindled to zero 
instances in recent years,93 largely due to a tougher stance 
on tax rules by the IRS.94 Thus, the data included in this 




89 Id. Performance-vested stock option plans are analogous to 
performance-vested restricted option plans: in addition to the traditional 
retention criteria, the recipient will realize no value from the option unless 
the specified performance conditions are met. See Walker, supra note 86, 
at 631 n.65. 
90 See Finance Committee Hearing, supra note 22, at 42. 
91 See Bickley, supra note 88, at 8; see also FREDERIC W. COOK & CO., 
INC., THE 2010 TOP 250, at 1, 22 (2010), 
http://www.fwcook.com/content/Documents/Publications/The_2010_Top_25
0_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4CF-HVBB]. 
92 See Walker, supra note 61, at 1507. 
93 In a study of options granted to CEOs of 1000 companies in 1992, 
Kevin Murphy found that only three percent were issued in-the-money. 
Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in 3B THE HANDBOOK OF LAB. 
ECON. 2485, 2508 (O. Ashenfelter & D. Card eds., Elsevier 1999). In a 2008 
study of the 250 largest companies included in the S&P 500 Index, 
Frederick W. Cook & Co. found no instances of discounted options; Cook’s 
later studies omit the category of discounted options, pointing to their 
demise. The 2008 Top 250: Long-Term Incentive Grant Practices for 
Executives, FREDERIC W. COOK & CO., INC. 6 (2008), 
http://www.fwcook.com/content/Documents/Publications/2008_Top_250.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5W6D-FVVF]. For later years, see also The 2009 Top 250: 
Long-Term Incentive Grant Practices for Executives, FREDERIC W. COOK & 
CO., INC. (2009), http://www.fwcook.com/content/Documents/Publications/ 
2009_Top-250-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/UBC8-R3BR]. 
94 See supra Section II.C.1. See also the more recent development in 
Sutardja v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 358, 369 (2013), in which the court 
held that discounted stock options are a type of deferred compensation to 
which 409A applies. 
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comprehensively covers the gamut of possible components of 
equity compensation. 
B. Evidence on the Decline of Options Grants as 
Compensation 
While the inclusion of both stock and options in executive 
compensation suites attempts to link executive interests 
with those of shareholders, the two function very differently 
in terms of incentives and risks.95 As described in Section II, 
Congress and federal regulators interminably legislate 
against the use of stock options. This Section describes how 
the equity composition of executive compensation packages 
has changed over the past decade in favor of stock 
compensation. 
1. Aggregate Increase in Stock and Decrease in 
Option Compensation 
Over the last ten years, there has been a significant 
reduction in option compensation and a sharp increase in 
stock compensation in executive pay packages. The following 
tables compare the aggregate contribution of stock options 
and stock to total senior executive pay at public companies 
for which executive pay data is available between 2006 and 
2014.96 Figure 1 and Table 1 both track the changes in option 
compensation, stock compensation, and total equity 
compensation as percentages of total compensation for the 
years between 2006 and 2014. Figure 1 visually depicts the 
trend, while Table 1 numerically describes both the absolute 
changes in equity compensation as well as the rate of change 





95 See infra Section IV. 
96 As discussed earlier in this Section, the analysis is limited to the 
group of companies listed on S&P’s Compustat database and by the 
inaccurate basis for comparison for the years prior to 2006.  
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97 This row is the result of a paired t-test comparing the two means 
using Stata’s t-test command. The results show that while the stocks and 
options given out were relatively similar in 2006, only one year later the 
averages diverged in a statistically meaningful way. Although a more 
nuanced statistical analysis (e.g., a multivariable analysis) could be 
performed, such an analysis would require significant controls to address 
problems such as the omitted variable bias. Because the purpose of this 
Note is merely to document the changes in equity compensation, rather 




















































 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Option 12.57% 15.24% 14.90% 13.31% 12.79% 12.47% 10.96% 10.71% 9.98% 
Change  2.67% -0.34% -1.59% -0.41% 0.32% -1.51% -0.2% -0.73% 
Stock 14.38% 22.80% 23.64% 21.80% 24.27% 27.10% 28.56% 32.18% 34.24% 
Change  8.42% 0.84% -1.84% 2.47% 2.83% 1.46% 3.62% 2.06% 
Total 26.95% 38.04% 38.54% 35.11% 37.06% 39.57% 39.52% 42.89% 44.22% 





2.79% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
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As Figure 1 depicts, options and stock accounted for 
virtually the same percentage of the aggregate value of 
senior executive pay in 2006—just before the 
implementation of the change in the tax and accounting 
rules.98 Options accounted for 12.5%, and stock accounted for 
14%.99 David Walker’s pre-2008 analysis on the make-up of 
pay packages of senior executives at S&P 500 companies 
shows that prior to 2002, stock had never accounted for more 
than 15% of total ex ante compensation.100 In 2007, however, 
immediately after the tax and accounting rules came into 
effect, stock jumped to almost 23% of total compensation, an 
increase of eight percentage points.101 From then on, the 
contribution of stock pay continued to rise, reaching over 
34% of total compensation and almost 80% of equity 
compensation in 2014.102 Option pay, on the other hand, 
steadily declined since 2007, reaching just below 10% of total 
compensation in 2014, or approximately 23% of equity 
compensation.103 By 2014, the difference between stock and 
option compensation had widened to over 24% of total 
compensation.104 
Previous scholarship predicted that overall equity pay 
would continue to rise after the recession of 2008.105 These 
results confirm that view. In 2008, total equity compensation 
accounted for almost 39% of the value of the executive 
compensation package.106 Total equity compensation steadily 
increased to over 44% in 2014, far overtaking the pre-2008 
levels.107 As Table 1 shows, stock compensation generally 
tracks total equity compensation. Thus, the overall rise in 
 
98 See supra Figure 1. 
99  See supra Table 1. 
100 See Walker, supra note 86, at 633. 
101 See supra Table 1. 
102 Id. 2009 is the exception to this trend, when total equity 
compensation also dipped.  
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 See, e.g., Walker, supra note 61, at 1509. 
106 See supra Table 1. 
107 Id. 
ADES-LAURENT – FINAL   
374 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2017 
the equity proportion of total compensation can be largely 
attributed to the increase in stock compensation. The 
evidence above suggests that firms across the United States 
are embracing two themes: the first is pay-for-performance 
codified in Section 953 of Dodd-Frank, while the second is 
the preference for conservative behavior. Preliminary studies 
on 2015 suggest that the trend continues.108 
2. Effects of CEO’s Age on Equity Composition 
Yet, the increase in stock compensation could simply be a 
function of executives growing more risk-averse as they age. 
Prior academic scholarship, as well as formal psychological 
and behavioral economic studies, suggests that age affects 
the risk tolerance of individuals.109 One possibility is that 
 
108 Eleanor Bloxham, Years of CEO Stock Incentives Are Causing 
Economic Volatility Today, FORTUNE (Feb. 1, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/02/01/ceo-pay-stock-economic-volatility/ 
[https://perma.cc/9QRR-Y88K]. 
109 See, e.g., Jarkko Peltomäki, Steve Swidler, & Sami Vähämaa, Age, 
Gender, and Risk-Taking: Evidence from the S&P 1500 Executives and 
Firm Riskiness (Dec. 15, 2016) (unpublished study), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2547516. The authors 
examined whether the age of a firm’s top executives is reflected in firm-
level riskiness. Using data on CEOs and CFOs at the S&P 1500 firms, 
they found that executives grow more risk-averse with age and may 
constrain excessive risk-taking by their firms. See also Gurdip S. Bakshi & 
Zhiwu Chen, Baby Boom, Population Aging, and Capital Markets, J. BUS., 
Apr. 1994, at 176 (finding a negative relationship between age and risky 
investment behavior); Anika K. Josef et al., Stability and Change in Risk-
Taking Propensity Across the Adult Lifespan, 111 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
430, 436 (Sept. 2016) (showing the propensity to take risks particularly 
declines after 30 in young adults and after 65 for older adults); Julia 
Deakin et al., Risk Taking During Decision-Making in Normal Volunteers: 
Changes with Age, 10 J. INT’L NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL SOC. 590, 593 (2004) 
(finding older adults less willing to take risks); Don Bellante & Carole A. 
Green, Relative Risk Aversion Among the Elderly, 13 REV.  FIN. ECON. 269, 
277 (2004) (finding older adults picked more risk-averse options through 
an analysis of investment portfolio allocations); Victor H. Vroom & Bernd 
Pahl, Relationship Between Age and Risk Taking Among Managers, 55 J.  
APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 399, 403 (1971) (finding a significant negative 
relationship between age and both risk-taking and the value placed upon 
risk). But see John E. Grable, Financial Risk Tolerance and Additional 
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older executives bargain for renewed compensation packages 
that reflect a lower tolerance for risk, choosing stock 
compensation over option compensation. The evidence 
contained in Figure 2, however, suggests that the more likely 
answer is attributable to a general trend in favor of 
incentivizing conservative behavior.110 
Figure 2 describes the percentage of options and stock of 
total compensation for executives under age forty-five and 





Factors That Affect Risk Taking in Everyday Money Matters, 14 J. BUS. & 
PSYCHOL. 625 (2000) (finding a positive relationship between age and risk 
taking). 
110 This analysis does not mean to suggest that the findings are 
statistically significant when controlling for factors like industry or tenure. 
Rather, this Section provides the evidence as descriptive difference. 
111 The average age for a CEO in 2015 was fifty-five. Executives aged 
forty-five and younger represent the bottom quartile, while those aged 
sixty-four and older represent the top quartile. Interestingly, the evidence 
shows that in 2006 more than sixteen times as many executives sixty-four 
and older (2548) were recorded than those forty-five and younger (154). By 
2014, however, the numbers had evened out: 602 executives sixty-four and 
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TABLE 2 
 
The evidence demonstrates that the pay suites of older 
executives generally contain a lower percentage overall of 
equity compensation than those of younger executives, thus 
affirming either that older executives are indeed more risk-
averse than younger executives at the time of hire, or that 
they have kept essentially the same executive compensation 
package since the start of their tenure. The difference in 
option compensation between older and younger executives, 
however, has generally remained within two percentage 
points.114 Hence, it is difficult to conclude that the lower 
tolerance for risk attributed to older executives is responsible 
for the general decline in the use of option compensation. 
Were that the case, the increase in stock compensation of 
younger executives would not have so drastically outpaced 
the increase in that of older executives. 
 
112 For explanation, see supra note 97. 
113 Id. 
114 See supra Table 2. 2011 is an outlier, when executives younger 
than forty-five received almost thirteen percent of their total compensation 
in stock options, while executives older than sixty-four received ten 
percent in stock options. 
 Executive Younger than 45 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Stock 8.49% 23.58% 21.91% 20.29% 22.49% 25.55% 31.26% 31.90% 35.49% 






0% 5.24% 0.13% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
 Executive Older than 64 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Stock  15.72% 25.59% 23.40% 19.09% 21.27% 23.63% 24.29% 26.93% 31.36% 






0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
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Figure 2 and Table 2 show that senior executive pay 
composition of younger executives tracks the general trend 
seen in Figure 1 far more closely than does that of older 
executives. Thus, executive turnover seems to be the 
stronger determinant of senior executive compensation, with 
compensation packages determined by the general trends at 
the time of hire.115 While both older and younger executives 
may be recruited for open positions, executives who are 
under forty-five in 2014, for example, are far less likely to 
have been in the same position five years earlier. Consider 
the executive who is hired in 2004, and who bargained for 
the receipt of one million options each year. Her 
compensation package in 2014 will look drastically different 
from that of the new CEO hired in the wake of Dodd-Frank, 
with the company more likely to structure compensation 
packages to induce senior executives to focus on long-term 
effects. Thus, the ages in 2014 of the 2004 hiree and the 2014 
hiree are likely statistically insignificant, although this 
analysis is beyond the scope of this Note. Rather, younger 
executives are more likely than new hires to have been 
among the company’s five highest paid employees several 
years earlier. In sum, the pay packages of younger 
executives are more likely to reflect the prevailing trends in 
executive compensation than those of older executives. 
3. Trends for CEOs 
Many of the headlines and studies decrying “excessive” 
executive compensation have focused on the pay of CEOs.116 
 
115 See supra note 111. There has been a drastic decrease in the 
number of executives aged sixty-four and older, and a sharp increase in 
those aged forty-five and younger between 2006 and 2014. This further 
suggests that the result is due to executive turnover rather than tenured 
executives growing more risk-averse with age. 
116 See, e.g., Joann S. Lublin, How Much the Best-Performing and 
Worst-Performing CEOs Got Paid, WALL ST. J. (June 25, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-much-the-best-and-worst-ceos-got-paid-
1435104565. The article called out Viacom Inc.’s Philippe Dauman and 
General Electric Co.’s Jeff Immelt as two of the ten best-paid CEOs and as 
receiving higher compensation in 2015 despite the total shareholder value 
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Yet the legislation and tax restructuring discussed in Part II 
should affect the composition of all senior executive 
compensation packages equally: the SEC did not single out 
CEOs for enhanced disclosure. The evidence in Figure 3, 
however, paints a different story. 
Figure 3 compares the percentages of stock and options in 

















at each company falling that year. Id.; see also Michael C. Jensen & Kevin 
J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much You Pay, But How, HARV. 
BUS. REV. (1990), https://hbr.org/1990/05/ceo-incentives-its-not-how-much-
you-pay-but-how [https://perma.cc/3PD7-K482](providing a review of U.S. 
CEO compensation from 1969 to 1983 and revealing that CEO pay is 
hardly keyed to the performance of the corporations they run). See also 
Walker, supra note 86, at 613 for a study of the make-up of CEO 
compensation packages between 1992 and 2006. 
117 Interestingly, the data include different numbers of CEOs than 
CFOs. In 2006, 1333 CEOs, but only 770 CFOs, were included. In 2013, 
there were about 1000 more CEOs reported than CFOs. However, by 2014, 
the gap had narrowed: 1773 CEOs were included, compared to 1771 CFOs. 
Interestingly, the SEC disclosure rules mandate that each company must 
report the executive compensation package make-up of the CEO, CFO, and 
the three next-highest-paid executives; consequently, after 2006, the 
number of CEOs and CFOs reported should be identical. Executive 
Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158, 53,241 
(Sept. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 232, 239, 240, 245, 
249, 274). Resolving this discrepancy is beyond the scope of this Note.  
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FIGURE 3 
 
Figure 3 demonstrates that while both components of 
CEO equity compensation outpaced equity compensation for 
all executives, the components of CEO equity compensation 
grew at different rates. The difference between the option 
composition of CEO compensation and overall compensation 
narrowed over time. In 2006, options comprised 15% of 
CEOs’ packages compared to 12.5% overall. The most recent 
data from 2014 show that while CEOs are still granted more 
options than other executives, the difference in option 
composition between CEOs and other executives is currently 
only 1.5%. The difference between the stock compensation of 
CEOs and that of executives overall, however, has widened 
from a gap of 2% in 2006 to almost 6% in 2014. Stocks 
currently make up about 78% of CEOs’ equity pay and 
almost 40% of the total compensation package. 
It is unsurprising that CEOs receive a greater 
composition of their compensation in the form of equity pay 
for two reasons. The first is that the CEO is the public face of 
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external shareholders.118 Thus, it is logical to tie a greater 
percentage of a CEO’s pay to the performance of the 
company. The second is that equity-based pay may give 
CEOs an incentive to take on risk. If stock returns dip, for 
example, CEOs will begin to worry about their own portfolios 
and consider an acquisition or share buy-back to increase the 
value of the shares. Other senior executives, including CFOs, 
are not granted the same decision-making authority as 
CEOs, so CFOs’ base salaries have greater weight in their 
compensation mix.119 Figure 3 demonstrates that CEOs 
received over 7% more equity compensation in 2014 than 
other senior executives.  
Thus, the shift to stock-based compensation has more 
quickly and drastically affected CEO pay compared to that of 
other senior executives. Additionally, this shift toward stock-
based pay has had more of an impact on CEO compensation 
than did the shift away from option-based pay. That the 
difference between stock and option compensation has 
fluctuated over the nine-year period shows that companies, 
neither mandated by SEC disclosure regulations nor 
incentivized by tax rules, have taken it upon themselves to 
adjust the pay of CEOs more sharply than that of other 
senior executives. 
 
118 A.G. Lafley, What Only the CEO Can Do, HARV. BUS. REV., May 
2009, https://hbr.org/2009/05/what-only-the-ceo-can-do [https://perma.cc/ 
7LTR-W4M6]. 
119 The composition of CFO equity compensation closely tracks that of 
overall equity compensation. After 2007, the difference between CFO 
equity compensation and overall equity compensation barely wavered 
above 1% for both stock and option compensation. This result is not 
unexpected: SEC disclosure rules and tax rules have vacillated between 
including CFOs among the most highly compensated executives, and 
mandating the disclosure of CFO compensation regardless of whether they 
are the most highly compensated executives. Executive Compensation and 
Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. at 53,241; see supra note 63. Data 
is author’s own. 
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4. Firm Size 
A number of authors have used firm size to evaluate 
executive compensation.120 As the S&P 500 index includes 
the companies that dominate the U.S. stock market in terms 
of market capitalization, it is generally used as a benchmark 
for academic studies.121 Furthermore, large firms—including 
Aetna, Oracle, and CBS—have become household names and 
have received the brunt of the blame for runaway executive 
compensation.122 
Given the implications of firm size in prior studies, 
perhaps the composition of executive compensation should 
vary accordingly—indicated by the S&P 500, MidCap 400, 
and SmallCap 600 indices. Below in Figure 4 and Table 3, 
the senior executive pay packages of S&P 500 firms are 
 
120 See, e.g., Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, Why Has CEO Pay 
Increased So Much?, 123 Q. J. ECON. 20 (forthcoming 2008) (finding a 
positive correlation between CEO pay and market capitalization in market 
equilibrium); Marianne Bertand & Kevin F. Hallock, The Gender Gap in 
Top Corporate Jobs, 55 INDUS. LAB. REL. REV. 3, 7 (2001) (finding that the 
gender pay gap among the highest paid executives is positively related to 
firm size); Peter F. Kostiuk, Firm Size and Executive Compensation, J. 
HUM. RESOURCES 90 (1990) (finding that there is significant variability in 
the level of compensation between firms of the same size); Mary Ellen 
Carter & Luann J. Lynch, An Examination of Executive Stock Option 
Repricing, 61 J. FIN. ECON. 207, 219 (2001) (finding that stock option 
resetting is more common in smaller firms). 
121 There is over $7.8 trillion benchmarked to the index, capturing 
approximately eighty percent of market capitalization. S&P 500, S&P DOW 
JONES INDICES, http://us.spindices.com/indices/equity/sp-500 
[https://perma.cc/VYG3-P8GM]. 
122 See, e.g., Theo Francis & Joann S. Lublin, CEO Pay Rises 
Moderately; a Few Reap Huge Rewards, WALL ST. J. (May 27, 2014), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/ceo-pay-rises-moderately-a-few-reap-huge-
rewards-1401235102?tesla=y; David Gelles, For the Highest-Paid C.E.O.s, 
the Party Goes On, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/17/business/for-the-highest-paid-ceos-
the-party-goes-on.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/4EP9-KNFM]; Paul 
Hodgson, Why Oracle Shareholders Keep Rejecting The Company’s 
Executive Pay, FORTUNE (Nov. 25, 2015), 
http://fortune.com/2015/11/25/oracle-shareholders-executive-pay/ 
[https://perma.cc/4JDD-RJBT]. 
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compared with those of MidCap 400 firms and SmallCap 600 
firms to identify whether firm size dictates the composition 






 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Ratio(SM) 0.82 1.44 1.55 1.68 1.79 2.25 2.59 3.38 3.74 
Ratio(MD) 1.32 1.74 1.75 1.91 2.35 2.90 3.08 3.43 4.03 
Ratio(SP) 1.22 1.58 1.57 1.53 1.97 2.04 2.49 2.72 3.07 
 
The total equity composition of senior executive pay at 
S&P 500 companies is markedly higher than that of either 
 
123 As with the data on executive age, this analysis does not mean to 
suggest that the findings are as statistically significant when controlling 
for factors like industry. Rather, this Section provides the evidence as 
descriptive difference. 
124 This table describes the ratio between the percentages of stock and 
option grants for SmallCap, MidCap, and S&P 500 companies found 
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MidCap or SmallCap firms: by 2014, executives at S&P 
companies received 54% of their compensation in equity pay, 
compared to 44% at MidCap firms and 41% at SmallCap 
firms. Figure 4 shows that in the case of SmallCap firms, 
equity pay only made up about 19% of executive 
compensation in 2006, but jumped to 32% in 2007. While the 
MidCap and S&P 500 firms show a similar increase in 2007, 
equity has been the most substantial component of executive 
compensation at S&P 500 firms for the entirety of the study. 
These results demonstrate that after the tax and disclosure 
changes in 2006, the structure of executive compensation 
changed universally. 
Comparing the increase in total equity compensation to 
the weight of the equity components reveals interesting 
differences. First, although the percentage of total equity 
compensation increased overall, the rate of growth is far 
faster at SmallCap and MidCap firms than at S&P 500 
companies. There is an approximate 20% increase for the 
smaller firms, and a 10% increase for the larger firms. 
Second, the weight of stock options overall decreases after 
2007, but far more rapidly for S&P 500 firms (over 7%) than 
for either of the two smaller firm groups (about 4% each). 
Finally, Table 3 shows the ratio between stock and option 
compensation for each of the firm group indices. Similarly, 
by 2014, there is a significant departure between the ratios 
of SmallCap and MidCap firms and that of S&P 500 firms: 
the percentage of stock compensation is thus far higher than 
that of option compensation at the smaller firms. In 2006, 
however, the ratios not only were smaller overall, but also 
much closer in size across the three firm indices. Thus, the 
results in Figure 4 and Table 3 reveal that while the total 
equity compensation and component weights are 
significantly different for firms across the S&P 500, MidCap 
400, and SmallCap 600 indices, the change in growth 
between the component parts remains relatively similar 
across the board. 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS 
The composition of executive compensation suites drew 
much scrutiny in the last decade from commentators and 
lawmakers.125 The evidence presented in this Note shows 
that since 2006, senior executives are increasingly likely to 
be rewarded with stock compensation rather than option 
compensation, with a particularly dramatic surge following 
the financial crisis and corresponding congressional action.126 
The data also demonstrate that this trend discriminates by 
neither firm size nor executive age. 
This Section discusses two implications of these findings 
for current debates on executive compensation at public 
companies. First, executives compensated in stock options 
tend to engage in riskier behavior, since option-based 
compensation allows them to benefit from the upside of a 
bold decision without suffering the consequences of the 
downside. Consequently, executives may generate benefits at 
the expense of the shareholder. Given the drastic decrease in 
option compensation, we expect to see far more conservative 
behavior at public companies—and as a consequence, an 
increase in shareholder activism to counter this trend. 
Second, the shift from option-based compensation to 
stock-based compensation has important tax implications. 
While the tax code favors option-based compensation,127 
many senior executives currently receive the majority of 
their equity compensation in the form of company stock. 
Attempts to fit stock-based compensation into an option-
based tax code have created perverse results, harming firms 
and shareholders alike.128 
A. Risk-Taking for Executives 
One purpose of executive compensation plans is to align 
the incentives of executives with those of shareholders. A 
 
125 See supra notes 3 and 4. 
126 For a discussion of this evidence, see supra Section III.B. 
127 See supra Section II.C.1. 
128 See infra Section IV.A and Section IV.B. 
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great challenge is to counteract the executive’s natural risk 
aversion and self-advancement.129 Stock options are 
generally presented as the solution because they have an 
asymmetric payoff: a “virtually unlimited” upside if stock 
prices rise, and only minimal consequence if the executive’s 
strategy fails to increase stock prices, since the executive 
does not bear any additional loss other than the loss of 
options.130 The underpinning is that the objective option 
value increases with stock price volatility. Indeed, Bebchuk 
et al. argue that efficient pay contracts should include a mix 
of stock and options that best balances incentives and risk.131 
The first subsection more deeply discusses the problems that 
suboptimal risk-taking cause, while the second considers 
shareholder activism as a possible consequence to 
suboptimal risk-taking. 
1. Risk-Taking: The Issue 
There have long been concerns that options may provide 
harmful impetuses that drive executives to immoderately 
take risks and decrease dividends to shareholders. Richard 
Posner declared that an overreliance on stock options 
incentivized CEOs to create stock price bubbles and “hope for 
the best.”132 Accordingly, and especially in the aftermath of 
the accounting scandals of the early 2000’s and the financial 
crisis of 2008, legislators and regulators became determined 
to disfavor stock options. 
Yet, suboptimal risk-taking can take the form of either 
excessive risk-taking or underinvestment—both of which 
 
129 There is a wealth of academic literature that rests on the 
assumption of global risk aversion by executives. See, e.g., Bebchuk & 
Fried, supra note 7; Bebchuk et al., supra note 9; Bhagat & Romano, supra 
note 5; Jackson, supra note 9; David I. Walker, The Law and Economics of 
Executive Compensation: Theory and Evidence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 232 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. 
McDonnell eds., 2011). 
130 Lee Harris, CEO Retention, 65 FL. L. REV. 1753, 1763 (2013). 
131 Bebchuk et al., supra note 9, at 756–57. 
132 RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ’08 
AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009). 
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may lead to reductions in aggregate welfare. In the absence 
of devices like stock options, there is good reason to believe 
that managers will be overly conservative.133 Without the 
incentives tied to option compensation, executives are less 
likely to take risks for two reasons. First, executives make 
significant investments in the firm, which they are unlikely 
to recoup if the company fails. Second, failure can impose 
significant losses on executives in terms of reputational 
capital. Thus, because executives reap high salaries and 
benefits from their positions, they likely will not make waves 
and risk their jobs for a riskier project that their 
shareholders may prefer.134 Presumably, executives need to 
be prodded to take steps contrary to their own priorities. 
Indeed, executives have every incentive to reduce their risk 
exposure even as equity pay enhances options for them, by 
hedging, backdating option grants, and similar schemes.135 
The tension between mitigating recklessness and 
avoiding excessive conservatism is clear. Forcing executives 
to hold stock rather than options mitigates earnings 
manipulation and “bet-the-company” risk taking, but also 
increases executive risk-aversion and conservatism.136 Risk-
averse executives will generally prefer shorter-term, more 
incremental projects that are relatively safe, over longer-
term research and development intensive projects, which are 
more risky.137 Shareholders may wish to encourage 
 
133 Walker’s article demonstrates that as risk aversion increases, the 
optimal executive pay design shifts in the direction of stock, since a highly 
risk-averse option recipient will greatly discount options that have a more 
remote payoff prospect. See Walker, supra note 86, at 622.  
134 David I. Walker, The Challenge of Improving the Long-Term Focus 
of Executive Pay, 51 B.C.L. REV. 435, 446 (2010). 
135 Id. at 442 (at the extreme, hedging transactions can completely 
eliminate firm-specific risk). See also supra Section II.C.3 for a discussion 
on backdating option grants. 
136 Walker, supra note 14, at 447. 
137 As one example, consider a large investment in research and 
development by a pharmaceutical company. The cost of bringing a new 
drug to market is very sensitive to changes in science and technology, 
shifts in the types of drugs under development, and changes in the 
regulatory market. Consequently, it is impossible to predict with certainty 
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executives to be more aggressive and engage in beneficial 
risk-taking that matches shareholders’ preferences; risky 
projects may be more valuable than safe projects for 
shareholders. The concern is that this new balance of equity 
compensation could shift too far in the direction of 
conservatism, halting the long-term performance of U.S. 
companies. 
2. Increased Shareholder Activism as a 
Consequence of Suboptimal Risk-Taking 
This suboptimal risk-taking on the part of CEOs brings 
the firm back to the original agency problem that stock-
option compensation was intended to fix. The natural 
aversion on the part of the manager, who stands to lose 
invested wealth, firm-specific human capital, and the 
benefits associated with control, lies counter to shareholders’ 
interests. Because risk and reward are positively correlated, 
a higher NPV project will likely be the riskier one—and, 
generally speaking, shareholders will prefer that project, 
even though managers may prefer the less risky project. 
Thus, unlike managers who are risk-averse, shareholders 
come to the table with the financial incentive to maximize 
firm value. Shareholder activism shifts the balance by 
allowing shareholders to vote out the CEO if her 
underperformance limits the firm. Thus, a change in pay 
 
the cost of bringing a new drug to market from estimated costs for drugs 
whose development began more than a decade ago. Additionally, the full 
cost of bringing a new drug to market requires huge outlays of cash, which 
ties up cash flows and may prevent the company from paying off its debt. 
This could lead to a sharp decrease in stock price, initially—until (or if) the 
drug generates massive returns at some future date. Between 2010–2014, 
143 new products were launched with projected lifetime revenues of $955 
billion, equaling returns of 5.5%. At the same time, however, for every $5 
gained through asset launch, $2 are lost through failure. DELOITTE CTR. 
FOR HEALTH SOLUTIONS, MEASURING THE RETURN FROM PHARMACEUTICAL 
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structures can be viewed as a justification for further 
shareholder reform. 
The past decade shows that shareholder activism has 
been steadily increasing, both in terms of monitoring 
managers and effectuating decisions.138 Since the end of 
2009, 15% of companies on the S&P 500 index have faced an 
activist campaign,139 and activists have not discriminated in 
terms of firm size, age, or prestige. Indeed, recently, activists 
have targeted several of the largest firms by market 
capitalization,140 the oldest firm on the NYSE,141 and today’s 
technology and consumer giant.142 While out of the 
approximately 8000 hedge funds, only 71 (less than 1%) are 
activist, the activist funds account 4% of the $120 billion 
under management in 2014 and raised one-fifth of all cash 
 
138 Andrew C. W. Lund & Gregg D. Polsky, The Diminishing Return of 
Incentive Pay in Executive Compensation Contracts, 87 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 677, 693 (2012). 
139 Activist Funds: An Investor Calls, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 7, 2015), 
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21642175-sometimes-ill-
mannered-speculative-and-wrong-activists-are-rampant-they-will-change-
american [https://perma.cc/SZ98-EN42] (defining “campaign” as “an effort 
to change a firm’s strategy, acquire board seats or remove managers.”). 
140 In 2013, Bill Ackman of Pershing Square began a campaign 
against Procter & Gamble that resulted in its CEO’s replacement in 2015. 
See Chris Isidore, Ackman Wins, P&G Dumps CEO, CNN (May 24, 2013), 
http://money.cnn.com/2013/05/24/news/companies/pg-ceo-ackman/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y3B8-ZUFL]. 
141 In 2014, Daniel Loeb of Third Point along with Marcato Capital 
Management launched a hostile and public bid for Sotheby’s that resulted 
in a win of three board seats for the fund. See Truce! Dan Loeb’s Third 
Point Gets 3 Board Seats, But Sotheby’s CEO Bill Ruprecht Stays on 




142 In 2013, the famed corporate raider Carl Icahn took a position in 
Apple Inc. to seek a larger dividend payout to shareholders. See Adam 
Satariano, Carl Icahn Pushes for Bigger Investor Payout from Apple, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 14, 2013), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles 
/2013-08-14/carl-icahn-pushes-for-bigger-investor-payout-from-apple 
[https://perma.cc/2D9Z-3H5N]. 
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flows.143 In the past five years, one in every seven companies 
on the S&P 500 has been on the receiving end of an attack, 
but one in two has had a large activist fund in its share 
register.144 Clearly, hedge funds are getting more involved in 
shareholder activism and hold the potential to encourage 
change in control when they see a firm underperforming. 
As Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock posit, “if a CEO 
makes mistakes (or perhaps just has back luck), both 
shareholders and directors will voice their criticism sooner 
and more strongly than in the days of yore, be it informally, 
[or] through . . . a board-induced CEO resignation.”145 
Furthermore, a recent paper by Thomas Keusch predicted 
that companies targeted by activist investors will see higher 
CEO turnover, especially when the activist wins a board 
seat.146 Before an activist engagement, CEO turnover at 
targeted firms tended to be similar to turnover at control 
group firms. Within two years post-engagement, however, 
targeted firms tended to see between 5–6% more turnover.147 
Today, the average tenure of an S&P 500 CEO has shrunk in 
the years after 1998 to a little more than six years, even 
while the S&P 500 Index rose more than threefold.148 And 
perhaps equally as important as the victories that the 
shareholders have won are the battles that they have not 
had to fight—those where they can influence managerial 
decision-making without ousting the CEO. 
 
143 Activist Funds: An Investor Calls, supra note 139. 
144 Shareholder Activism: Capitalism’s Unlikely Heroes, THE 
ECONOMIST (Feb. 7, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders 
/21642169-why-activist-investors-are-good-public-company-capitalisms-
unlikely-heroes [https://perma.cc/N9FT-VU3C]. 
145 Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. 
REV. 987, 1040 (2010). 
146 Thomas Keusch, Shareholder Power and Managerial Incentives 12 
(Mar. 2016) (unpublished working paper), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2746135 [https://perma.cc/Y4BS-JFZL]. 
147 Id. at 21. 
148 Joann S. Lublin, CEO Tenure, Stock Gains Often Go Hand-in-
Hand, WALL ST. J. (July 6, 2010, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527487039000045753251726814
19254. 
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Unlike other institutional investors who typically sell 
their shares when the portfolio company underperforms, 
hedge funds do not sell services to the class of companies 
they target. Consequently, they are independent actors in 
governance activism and are able to influence compensation 
and turnover decisions. Keusch’s evidence suggests that 
“hedge fund activists monitor whether CEOs’ actions are in 
line with shareholders’ interests and are in part responsible 
for rebalancing incentives in portfolio companies.”149 
Presenting a counterweight to the manager’s natural and 
policy-driven risk aversion, activists are able to fill the 
governance void that afflicts today’s public companies. 
Thus, the evidence in this Note may justify a movement 
towards further shareholder reforms that seek to give 
shareholders a larger voice. In 2009, SEC Chairman Mary 
Schapiro remarked that one way that Wall Street must 
repair itself after the financial crisis is by “giving 
shareholders a greater say on who serves on corporate 
boards, and how company executives are paid.”150 While 
steps have since been taken to grant shareholders greater 
power,151 the current model still fails to offer a “platform 
conducive to aggressive entrepreneurship,”152 and instead 
rewards risk aversion and institutional stability. 
 
149 Keusch, supra note 146, at 7. 
150 Zachary A. Goldfarb, SEC to Examine Boards’ Role in Financial 
Crisis, WASH. POST (Feb. 20, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/02/19/AR2009021903172.html?sid=ST2009021903
215 [https://perma.cc/C8TC-5P2Y]. 
151 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank, supra note 65, at §§ 951 (shareholder vote 
on executive compensation disclosures), 952 (independence of 
compensation committees) 953 and 955 (pay for performance and pay 
parity disclosures), 954 (clawbacks), 971 (proxy access), and 972 
(mandating statement of reasons not to split the chairman-CEO position), 
among others. 
152 William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against 
Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 655 (2010). 
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B. Tax Concerns 
After concluding that certain executive compensation 
practices are undesirable, Congress sought to use the tax 
code to discourage companies and their executives from 
engaging in such practices.153 The two examples discussed in 
this Note include the $1 million deduction limitation, unless 
pay is tied to performance,154 and the nonqualified deferred 
compensation regulation.155 This Part will discuss the 
unintended effects of the option-based tax code provisions on 
both public companies and shareholders now that stock 
grants comprise the majority of equity compensation. 
1. Deferrals 
Compared with stock compensation, option compensation 
allows executives to defer taxation beyond vesting.156 It also 
allows them to control the timing of the realization within 
the boundaries of vesting and expiration.157 This is because 
options are taxed at exercise rather than grant date.158 By 
deferring taxes, both the company and the executive pay tax 
at a later date. Doing so allows the amount deferred to grow 
unhindered until the taxable event at exercise. 
 
153 See I.R.C. § 162(m); see also supra Section II.C.1; Section II.C.2; 
I.R.C. § 409A. 
154 I.R.C. § 162(m); see also supra Section II.C.2. 
155 I.R.C. § 409A; see also supra Section II.C.1. 
156 The reason that option recipients may defer taxes is because, 
unlike publicly traded stock, options are difficult to value accurately before 
exercise. 
157 I.R.C. § 83(a). As an example, consider an executive who receives 
$100,000 of restricted stock that vests in three years. At the time of 
vesting, that $100,000 of restricted stock will be treated on the executive’s 
tax return as if they earned that amount in additional salary—and, if the 
share price climbs, the executive will have a higher tax bill. Furthermore, 
if the shares pay dividends, the payments will be taxed as ordinary income 
until the shares vest. After that, they will generally qualify for the 15% 
dividend tax rate. If the executive chooses to hold his or her shares after 
the vesting date, any increase in share price will be taxed as capital gains 
when they chooses to sell. 
158 Id. 
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From the executive’s perspective, the advantage of a tax 
deferral mimics an exemption from tax on compensation that 
otherwise would have been received.159 That the transaction 
remains open until the options are exercised results in 
extraordinarily large amounts of income for the option 
holders and equally large deductions for the company issuing 
the options. Thus, the value of the deferral to both the 
company and the executive will be reflected in higher 
earnings to the stockholders. The current prevalence of stock 
compensation causes companies to forego the deferral, which 
may lower the size of dividends paid to shareholders, reduce 
earnings per share, and lead to other levels of organizational 
inefficiency. 
2. Deductions 
While a tax provision can neither prevent companies from 
paying excessive compensation nor compel a particular 
compensation structure, it can make it more costly for a 
company to do what it otherwise would. Section 162(m) 
encourages the issuance of non-discounted options, since 
stock grants, unlike option compensation, are not considered 
“performance-based.”160 Thus, Section 162(m) can be 
considered an “option-based” tax code. This becomes 
problematic when the larger proportion of equity 
compensation is no longer options, but stock. As discussed, 
the SEC and other regulators steered companies towards 
granting a greater proportion of stock, making it increasingly 
difficult for companies to take advantage of the performance-
based exception to Section 162(m). Today, companies 
generally forfeit what could have been a Section 162(m) 
 
159 See David I. Walker, Is Equity Compensation Tax Advantaged?, 84 
B.U.L. REV. 695, 710 (2004). 
160 Recall that non-discounted options are those that are issued “at-
the-money” (options that are issued with an exercise price equal to the fair 
market value of the company’s stock on the date of the grant). Discounted 
options are those that are issued “in-the-money” (options with exercise 
prices less than the price of the underlying stock on the date of the grant). 
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deduction in order to meet the accounting requirements 
under FASB 123(R).161 
A number of companies today continue to pay 
compensation that is not deductible under Section 162(m) 
and consequently increase the company’s cost for that 
item.162 Presumably, a company would be better off in the 
absence of this penalty and other economically inefficient 
related costs. When a company absorbs the corporate tax and 
lowers its after-tax profits, the shareholders will initially 
bear the burden of a smaller after-tax return on their 
corporate equity.163 By 2005, almost fifty percent of 
American households owned stock, and in 2007, total 
retirement assets reached $17.6 trillion.164 Thus, while 
Congress may have aimed the tax penalties at executives, 
shareholders bear the burden—including indirect 
shareholders, who are less wealthy than institutional 
 
161 It is also important to note that prior to the promulgation of FASB 
123(R), companies regularly forfeited deductions in order to pay whatever 
compensation they decided is best. See Steven Balsam & Qin Jennifer Yin, 
Explaining Firm Willingness to Forfeit Tax Deductions Under Internal 
Revenue Code Section 162(m): The Million-Dollar Cap, 24 J. ACCT. & PUB. 
POL’Y 300, 321 (2005) (noting that in the mid-1990s, nearly forty percent of 
corporations admitted to forfeiting deductions because of Section 162(m)). 
162 See, e.g., Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 7. 
163 As one example, when Apple Inc. made Tim Cook its CEO in 
August 2011, it gave him one million shares of restricted stock that vested 
purely with the passage of time, meaning that it was not performance-
based. This grant was valued at $378 million at the time that it was made. 
See Charles Duhigg & David Kocieniewski, How Apple Sidesteps Billions 
in Taxes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/ 
04/29/business/apples-tax-strategy-aims-at-low-tax-states-and-
nations.html [https://perma.cc/CWF7-MH22]. Yet it did not meet the 
performance-based exception of Section 162(m) and therefore was not 
deductible. This costs shareholders over $100 million in additional taxes at 
the current tax rate. See also Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 7, at 46 
(“Executive compensation does not hurt shareholders directly; it hurts 
them indirectly, through their equity interests in the firm.”). 
164 Joy Sabino Mullane, Incidence and Accidents: Regulation of 
Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
485, 538 (2009). 
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shareholders and consequently more sensitive to fluctuations 
in their asset values. 
3. Current Tax Reform Legislation 
Congress has introduced numerous pieces of legislation in 
the past decade seeking to reform tax laws related to 
executive compensation. These include the Ending Corporate 
Tax Favors for Stock Options Act,165 the Ending Excessive 
Corporate Deductions for Stock Options Act,166 the Stop 
Subsidizing Multimillion Dollar Corporate Bonuses Act,167 
 
165 Ending Corporate Tax Favors for Stock Options Act, S. 2116, 
110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007), https://www.congress.gov/bill/110th-
congress/senate-bill/2116/text [https://perma.cc/B8Y2-T3RP] (seeking to 
decouple the amount of the employer’s deduction from the amount of the 
employee’s income inclusion for NQSOs and to eliminate the exemption of 
NQSOs from the $1 million limitation imposed by Section 162(m)). 
166 Ending Excessive Corporate Deductions for Stock Options Act, S. 
1491, 111th Congress (1st Sess. 2009) https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-
congress/senate-bill/1491/text [https://perma.cc/X938-PB3R] (seeking to 
reconcile the corporate tax benefits based on stock option compensation 
with the accounting expenses for such compensation). This legislation was 
prompted by a 2008 investigation that showed that U.S. companies 
reduced their taxes by billions of dollars by claiming $52 billion more in 
stock option tax deductions than the stock option tax expenses shown on 
their books. Press Release, Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Senate Investigations 
Subcommittee Releases New Data on Excessive Corporate Stock Option 




167 Stop Subsidizing Multimillion Dollar Corporate Bonuses Act, S. 
1476, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013), https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-
congress/senate-bill/1476/text [https://perma.cc/24ZQ-2GJM]. “This 
legislation would close a major loophole in current corporate tax law by 
putting an end to unlimited tax write-offs on performance-based executive 
pay” and calls for a $1 million deductibility ceiling on compensation that 
extends to all officers, directors, and employees. Press Release, Jack Reed 
United States Senator for Rhode Island, Reed, Blumenthal, Doggett Offer 
Bill to End Special Tax Exemptions for Huge CEO Bonuses (Jan. 10, 
2017), https://www.reed.senate.gov/news/releases/reed-blumenthal-dogget 
t-offer-bill-to-end-special-tax-exemptions-for-huge-ceo-bonuses 
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and the Income Equity Act,168 many of which are endorsed by 
organizations across party-lines.169 Yet, these regulations 
 
[https://perma.cc/VXL3-PH2K]. This bill was in response to a study that 
estimated that the tax deduction for executive compensation under Section 
162(m) cost the Treasury $7 billion in 2010 alone and $30.4 billion 
between 2007 and 2010. Press Release, Economic Policy Institute, 
Corporate Tax Deductions for Executive Pay Cost U.S. $7 Billion in Lost 
Revenue in 2010 (Aug. 14, 2012), http://www.epi.org/press/corporate-tax-
deductions-executive-pay-cost/ [https://perma.cc/R356-E77U]. Note that 
this bill was assigned to the House Ways and Means Committee and the 
Senate Finance Committee on April 29, 2015, which will both consider the 
bill before sending it to the floor for consideration. See also Section 3802 of 
the Tax Reform Act of 2014, H. R. 1, 113th Cong. (2d Sess. 2014), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/1/text 
[https://perma.cc/V6TZ-2UBU] (seeking to eliminate to the performance-
based exemption from the $1 million cap for the five highest paid 
corporate officers). 
168 Income Equity Act of 2015, H. R. 1305, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 
2015), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1305/text 
[https://perma.cc/GSG8-4ZR8] (seeking to deny all firms tax deductions on 
any executive pay that exceeds over twenty-five times the pay of the firm’s 
lowest-paid employee or $500,000, whichever is higher, and to set a 
deductibility cap on all forms of executive pay, which removes the 
“performance-based exemption” from Section 162(m)). Note that this bill 
was referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means in March 2015. 
169 For example, the Ending Corporate Tax Favors for Stock Options 
Act, S. 2116, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007) has been endorsed by the 
Consumer Federation of America, Citizens for Tax Justice, Tax Justice 
Network-USA, OMBWatch, the Financial Policy Forum, and the ACL-CIO. 
Press Release, Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, Levin Introduces Bill to End Double 
Standard in Corporate Tax Break for Executive Stock Options (Sept. 28, 
2007), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/media/ 
levin-introduces-bill-to-end-double-standard-in-corporate-tax-break-for-
executive-stock-options [https://perma.cc/K3XE-Z9M7]. The other bills 
mentioned are in similar positions. See e.g., Press Release, Homeland 
Security & Governmental Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, Senate Investigations Subcommittee Releases New Data 
on Excessive Corporate Stock Option Deductions Totaling $52 Billion 
(June 16, 2010), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/ 
investigations/media/senate-investigations-subcommittee-releases-new-
data-on-excessive-corporate-stock-option-deductions-totaling-52-billion 
[https://perma.cc/C73Z-LDSE]; Press Release, Rep. Doggett Calls For End 
to Tax Write-Off For Exorbitant Executive Bonuses (Jan. 29, 2014) 
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have languished in Congress, and based on recent history, it 
seems unlikely that any have much chance of passage. This 
continued legislative focus on reforming executive 
compensation indicates that it is an ongoing matter of public 
concern. The reforms are often imposed as a reaction to 
perceived abuses in executive pay or to economic downturns 
(which are generally associated with increases in income 
inequality).170 Consequently, the regulation is driven by 
political, rather than shareholder, agendas, which rarely 
embrace the forward-looking goal of creating shareholder 
value and instead are prescriptive. As eloquently stated by 
Senator Chuck Grassley (R-IA) of Section 162(m): “It was 
well-intentioned. But it really hasn’t worked at all. 
Companies have found it easy to get around the law. It has 
more holes than Swiss cheese . . . . These sophisticated folks 
are working with Swiss-watch-like devices to game this 
Swiss-cheese-like rule.”171 Section 162(m)’s aim was to create 
accountability in executive compensation, yet it spurred 
companies to evade its requirements through the options 
industry. New regulations are likely to have a similar effect. 
Rather than issuing knee-jerk reactions to corporate 
scandals that intend to shame executives into accepting 





170 Note that this correlation is associated with rising levels of 
unemployment. This Note does not make the claim that income inequality 
has caused the financial crisis—in fact, the evidence stacks in the other 
direction. See Michael D. Bordo & Christopher M. Meissner, Does 
Inequality Lead to a Financial Crisis? 1 (NBER Working Paper No. 17896, 
2012), http://www.nber.org/papers/w17896.pdf [https://perma.cc/NE3M-
TK86] (arguing that credit booms heighten the probability of a banking 
crisis, but finding no evidence that a rise in top income shares leads to 
credit booms). 
171 Press Release, Jack Reed, Reed-Blumenthal Introduce the Stop 
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efficacy of such policies, and whether it might be better for 
the companies to resolve these agency problems on their 
own. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the past few decades, public companies have 
compensated their senior executives largely with options—
which are not treated as an expense on the company’s books, 
are tax-favored, and (at least in the short-term) have linked 
executive pay to firm performance. This trend, however, has 
shifted in the past ten years: stock grants replaced options as 
the dominant form of equity pay. This Note presents the first 
comprehensive study of the change in the equity composition 
of executive compensation suites after the financial crisis. 
The evidence shows that stock grants now comprise the 
majority share of executive equity pay suites. The movement 
away from stock options and towards stock grants—in effect, 
a referendum on corporate risk-taking—cannot be explained 
away by differences in executive age or firm size. Instead, 
the increase in the proportion of stock compensation arises 
from the impact of the panoply of federal efforts to control 
executive compensation and mitigate risk. 
This finding has important implications for investors and 
regulators who wish to offset managerial influence over 
executive compensation at public companies. Investors 
should consider the degree of risk with which they are 
comfortable and consider contractual efforts to shift CEO 
incentives towards long-term strategies. Regulators should 
acknowledge the perverse incentives created by current tax 
and disclosure laws. Part of the problem is that regulation 
generally targets fairly narrow elements of compensation, 
allowing plenty of room for circumvention that comes at a 
cost to the company and shareholders alike. Additionally, by 
forcing executive pay to fit neatly into the box of their 
choosing, regulators have missed the forest for the trees: 
their focus limits types and amounts of pay, rather than 
addressing executive incentives. Moreover, the recent rules 
proposed on executive pay are likely to only aggravate these 
problems. Regulators should re-examine current policies 
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with an eye to realigning executive incentives with those of 
their shareholders; this may take time, but the quick fixes 
through the tax code, SEC disclosure requirements, and 
federal legislation have thus far proven counterproductive or 
caused unforeseen negative results. 
The data presented here cannot speak to the effects of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, since Section 953(a) will take effect through 
the forthcoming 2016 schedules. Whether the revised 
disclosure requirements will lead public companies to follow 
a historically similar path has yet to be determined. This 
Note offers an early glimpse into the composition of 
executive pay after the financial crisis. 
 
